(Ethical theory)
Ethical theory always needs attention, and with a
special urgency today. The classical
canon – centered on virtue or consequences or duty –
has opened the pathway to
sophisticated work in media ethics. However, a new
generation of media ethics in
the multicultural and transnational mode requires that
we retheorize existing theory
(see Christians, 2009). Rather than ethical theories
rooted in rationalism that are
rule-ordered and gendered masculine, beliefs and
worldviews should be made more
central in theory-making. Rather than a rule-based
system, theory should empower
the imagination to give us moral discernment and an
inside perspective on reality.
Even though we make an epistemologically acceptable
move to more dynamic theory,
a crucial challenge is whether it answers the
question, “Why should I be moral?”
This is a summary of the first primordial issue; what
follows is an elaboration.
Presuppositional thinking
Mainstream ethical theory, grounded in rationalism,
produces moral principles that
are unconditioned by circumstances. For ethical
rationalists, the truth of all legitimate
claims about moral obligation can be settled by
formally examining their logical structure.
Humans act against moral obligations only if they are
willing to be irrational.
This kind of media ethics, rooted in classical moral
philosophy, is unidimensional.
Autonomous moral agents are presumed to apply rules
consistently and
self-consciously to every choice. Through rational
processes, basic rules of morality
are created that everyone is obliged to follow and
against which all actions can be
evaluated. In communication ethics, neutral principles
operate by the conventions
of impartiality and formality. This is an ethics of
moral reasoning that arranges
principles in hierarchical fashion and rigorously
follows logic in coming to conclusions.
Journalism ethics that follows this approach,
therefore, is based on standards
and doctrines that guide professional practice. In
mainstream professional ethics,
codes of ethics are the typical format.
Utilitarianism is a single consideration theory, for
example. It does not simply
demand that we maximize general happiness, but renders
irrelevant all other moral
imperatives that are in conflict with it. Moral
reasoning is equivalent to calculating
the consequences for human happiness. Utilitarianism
presumes there is one
domain that determines what we ought morally to do.
The exactness of this onefactor
model is appealing, but gains its validity by leaving
out whatever cannot be
calculated. Kant is another example. He assimilated
ethics into logic. Moral laws to
be universally applicable must be free from inner
contradiction. Through the mental
calculus of willing an action to be universalized,
imperatives emerge unconditioned
by circumstances. Moral absolutes are identified in
the same rational way
that syllogisms are identified as valid or invalid.
A new generation of media ethics that is both
intercultural and international
needs to go beyond one-dimensional models by
incorporating presuppositions
into its theories. Human beings are committed to
presuppositions inescapably. All
human knowledge must take something as given. A faith
commitment is the condition
through which human cognition universally is
intelligible. Theories of morality
do not arise from an objectivist rationalism, but from
our fundamental beliefs
about the world. Worldviews are the gyroscope around
which our thinking and
experience revolve. They are the home of our ultimate
commitments at the core of
our being. Worldviews give meaning to our
consciousness. They represent a set of
basic beliefs about human destiny. Presuppositions are
therefore sine qua non in
rethinking moral theory
Why be moral?
Even if we broaden the boundaries of our
moral theory to include the presuppositional,
does this retheorizing answer the
question, “Why should I be moral?” When
theoretical models center on
decision-makers who are accountable to a principle,
then why I should be moral is pertinent
and answerable. However, when transnational
and intercultural beliefs and values are
the target and beginning point, the
issue seems obscure and tenuous.
An inescapable contribution of classical
theory is that they were serious about
addressing the question, “Why be moral?”
The only presuppositional theory that
is acceptable is one that answers it also.
The moral domain by its very character
entails the question. Like a magnetic
force, the good compels me as a moral agent.
Should no such imperative exist, morality
as a whole is incoherent. “Why should I
be moral?” is understood not as a
prudential question (“Why is morality in my
interest?”), but as a question about justification:
“Why should I accept the moral
demand as a demand upon me?” (cf. Hare,
2001).
The virtue ethics of Aristotle and
Confucius both assumed that moral obligations
have authority from the community to which
we belong. For Aristotle, the
city is like a parent; it has made us what
we are. Membership in a community
reaches beyond our values and sentiments
to engage our identity itself. To be true
to ourselves, we have to acknowledge the
authority of the moral demand our community
instills into us.
Another alternative from the classics is
to locate the authority of morality in
human nature, specifically in the organic
human inclinations. In this perspective,
we can tell what is good for us by looking
at what we are naturally inclined to act
upon. Doing the good benefits our human
flourishing. For Jeremy Bentham, for
example, the chief good is satisfaction,
and for all humans the source of their true
happiness is experiencing pleasure and
avoiding pain.
For Kant, reason demands moral action. It
is the nature of reason to will universal
law, and it demands this not only in
theories of science, but in practical thinking
about what we do. Hence, we ought to base
morality on reason. Reason is my
authority for acting morally.
If our motivation is only self-interest,
psychoanalysis is needed, not morality. If I
decide to seek a Provost’s position
because of my own career and without altruism,
then the moral domain has no validity.
Forty-six million Americans are without health
insurance. Why should I care about health
care reform if it means higher rates or
poorer quality for me? Politics or
economics could explain my position – health care is
currently out of control and providing it
more extensively hurts my small business. Or
politically, for the sake of our
international reputation and attracting foreign investment,
our country should be able to match or
exceed national health care anywhere in
the world.
Regarding the biological turn, why should
I be held accountable if the moral
arena is subsumed by sociobiology or
neuroscience? James Q. Wilson’s The Moral
Sense (1993)
faces the critique that morality and sense perception are two different
domains. Morality is not like other human
arenas, in this case, perception. I am
reading Charles Taylor’s The
Secular Age and too preoccupied with it to lay it
down. I feel a moral compulsion to attend
a university workshop on Palestinian
refugee camps, but decide in this instance
to keep reading. But, I have no choice
regarding perception. I’m at my desk and
the desk exists. The moral sense is inescapable,
but where is the moral demand in it?
For those of us committed to ethics, we
insist on moral obligations as crucial,
over the long term, to human action. It is
obvious in family life that self interest,
politics and economics do not exhaust our
motivations. Regarding the environment,
a vocabulary of moral obligation is taking
shape that will help ensure social
and cultural change. However,
psychoanalytic, economic, and political explanations
are so powerful that the moral domain is
typically rendered impotent. Once
again the urgent question – will a new
generation of presuppositional theory be
able to answer convincingly, “What should
I be moral?” To be intellectually legitimate,
resolving this issue is essential as media
ethics theory is retheorized.[1]
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